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PASSING THE BUCK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT COULD HAVE 
SIDESTEPPED THE IMPACT OF ITS CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 
IN SMITH v. CITY OF JACKSON 
INTRODUCTION 
The American workforce is growing ever older.  People are not only living 
longer, but they are remaining in the workforce longer as well.1  The oldest 
baby boomers are nearing or have already reached retirement age, while the 
youngest (those born in 1964) have recently reached the age of forty.2  Hence, 
an enormous group of workers is now protected by the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA).3 
For that reason, the 2005 Supreme Court case Smith v. City of Jackson4 
was an important decision that had potentially far-reaching implications for 
many Americans.  The case addressed the tenability under the ADEA of 
employment discrimination claims which alleged that a facially neutral 
employment decision had a disparate impact on older workers.  Not only 
would the decision resolve a circuit split which had gone unresolved since 
19935 as well as address an area of law which was the source of vigorous 
academic debate,6 but it would also, at least in theory, have a large impact on 
 
 1. The United States Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts that the 
number of workers over the age of 55 will grow by 49.1% over the next decade.  United States 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, News: BLS Releases 2004–14 Employment 
Projections (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecopro.pdf; cf. Most 
Employers Are Not Looking to Hire, Retain Older Workers, GAO Says, DAILY LAB. REP., Dec. 6, 
2005, at A7 (reporting that the growing number of older workers is a challenge to the economy 
that employers have yet to fully address). 
 2. See Lori D. Ecker & Joseph M. Gagliardo, Allowing Disparate Impact Claims Under the 
ADEA, 93 ILL. B.J. 198, 201 (2005); see also Kenneth R. Davis, Age Discrimination and 
Disparate Impact: A New Look at an Age-Old Problem, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 361, 361 (2005); 
Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Thirty: Where It’s Been, Where It 
Is Today, Where It’s Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 664 (1997). 
 3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–24 (2000).  The ADEA protects workers over the age of 40. 
 4. 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
 5. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), an important disparate treatment case 
to be discussed later in more detail, was decided in 1993.  See infra notes 56–57 (citing cases 
revealing the circuit split). 
 6. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 2; Michael Evan Gold, Disparate Impact Under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 25 BERKELY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2004); Douglas C. 
Herbert & Lani Schweiker Shelton, A Pragmatic Argument Against Applying the Disparate 
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both employers and employees precisely because of the large numbers of older 
workers in the American workforce.  Ostensibly, a decision for the plaintiffs in 
Smith, which would authorize disparate impact claims under the ADEA, would 
be a major victory for older employees and would lead to a higher number of 
successful age discrimination lawsuits. 
As this Note will argue, however, the decision rendered by the Supreme 
Court in Smith was a less-than-satisfying answer to the disparate impact 
question.  First, the holding of Smith makes it very unlikely that any plaintiff 
will in reality be able to state a cognizable disparate impact claim under the 
ADEA.  Whereas in racial or sexual discrimination impact cases an employer 
has to demonstrate that the action which resulted in the disparate impact on the 
protected age group was a business necessity, employers being sued for age 
discrimination will now be able to successfully defend a disparate impact claim 
by showing only that its action was reasonable.  As a result, few plaintiffs will 
be able to win a disparate impact suit because of the difficulty of showing that 
a business acted unreasonably.7 
Second, both the plurality opinion in Smith and that of Justice O’Connor 
were based on unpersuasive reasoning.  Each opinion seemed to do little more 
than simply summarize one of the opposing arguments of the disparate impact 
debate.  Unfortunately, as was stated by Professor Kenneth Davis, this debate 
turns on “a series of counterarguments, none of which is convincing.”8  The 
Court may have authorized disparate impact claims under the ADEA, but its 
rationale for doing so left something to be desired. 
Therefore, because of both the limited practical implications of the 
plurality’s holding and the problematic reasoning of the Court’s opinions, the 
Court should have deferred to the views of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) and held not only that disparate impact suits were viable 
 
Impact Doctrine in Age Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 625 (1996); Judith J. Johnson, 
Rehabilitate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Resuscitate the “Reasonable Factors 
Other Than Age” Defense and the Disparate Impact Theory, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1399 (2004); 
Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229 (1990); Rocco Cozza, Comment, Does the Theory of 
Disparate Impact Liability Apply in Cases Arising Under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act?: A Question of Interpretation, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 773 (2003); Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What 
a Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate Impact Theory Should Not Apply to the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REV. 267 (1995); Jonas Saunders, Note, Age 
Discrimination: Disparate Impact Under the ADEA After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins: Arguments 
in Favor, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 591 (1996); Brendan Sweeney, Comment, “Downsizing” 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: The Availability of Disparate Impact Liability, 41 
VILL. L. REV. 1527 (1996). 
 7. Courts have shown an unwillingness “to sit as a ‘super-personnel department’” and 
question the reasonableness of business decisions.  Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 
948, 957 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 8. Davis, supra note 2, at 379. 
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under the ADEA, but also that businesses could defend themselves only by 
showing that their actions were a business necessity.  Such an approach, which 
is similar to that taken by Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith,9 would have 
addressed both of these issues.  It would have provided a firm basis on which 
to rest the Court’s holding and would have given ADEA plaintiffs at least a 
realistic possibility of stating a valid disparate impact claim. 
Expanding on these ideas, Section I of this Note will provide the facts and 
procedural history of Smith v. City of Jackson as well as a brief summary of the 
history of disparate impact claims and the ADEA.  Section II will then detail 
the holding of the case as well as the rationale behind the concurring opinions.  
Finally, Section III will provide an analysis of the case.  It will focus on the 
limited application of the Court’s holding and the unpersuasive nature of the 
opinions and argue that the Court should have deferred to the EEOC’s 
interpretation of disparate impact liability under the ADEA. 
I.  HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
A. Facts and Procedural History of Smith v. City of Jackson 
In October of 1998, the city of Jackson, Mississippi instituted a pay plan 
which gave raises to all city employees.10  Several months later, in May of 
1999, the city provided raises to all police officers and dispatchers.11  The 
purpose of the overall plan, as stated by the city, was to “attract and retain 
qualified people, provide incentive for performance, maintain competitiveness 
with other public sector agencies and ensure equitable compensation to all 
employees regardless of age, sex, race and/or disability.”12  The pay raise for 
the police personnel was intended to make the officers’ salaries competitive 
with regional averages.13 
The pay raises for the police department were structured so that officers 
with less than five years tenure on the force were given raises that were 
proportionately greater than those who had served longer than five years.14  
Because most of the officers over the age of forty (although not all) had been 
with the department longer than five years, they received proportionately lower 
 
 9. Justice Scalia wrote that “[t]his is an absolutely classic case for deference to agency 
interpretation.”  Smith, 544 U.S. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  Unlike the position taken by this Note, however, Justice Scalia concurred with the 
plurality in its holding that disparate impact claims could be defended by citing reasonable factors 
rather than business necessity.  See id. 
 10. Id. at 231 (plurality opinion). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Smith, 544 U.S. at 231. 
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salary increases than did younger officers with shorter tenures.15  Because of 
that disparity, a group of older officers filed suit against the city under the 
ADEA, alleging both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.16 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi 
granted summary judgment to the city on both claims.17  On the issue of the 
disparate treatment claim, the Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of 
Appeals reversed and remanded, stating that sufficient discovery concerning 
whether the city had acted with the requisite intent had not been completed.18  
The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment on the disparate impact 
claim; however, ruling that even assuming that the officers had shown the facts 
necessary for a disparate impact claim, such claims were not cognizable under 
the ADEA.19  The Supreme Court then granted certiorari20 in order to 
determine whether disparate impact claims of employment discrimination were 
indeed available under the ADEA and to resolve a circuit split that had 
developed concerning the issue.21 
B. Disparate Impact and the ADEA 
1. A Brief History of the ADEA 
The ADEA was passed in 1967, three years after the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.22  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act had made it illegal to 
discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or religion.23  While Congress debated 
including “age” in Title VII along with the categories of “race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin,” it was ultimately not included.24  Congress did, 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 231. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.; see Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 351 F.3d 183, 198 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 19. Smith, 544 U.S. at 231; see Smith, 351 F.3d at 195. 
 20. Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 541 U.S. 958 (2004). 
 21. For an illustration of the circuit split, see infra notes 56–57. 
 22. Gold, supra note 6, at 12. 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2000).  Title VII provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
  (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin; or 
  (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities 
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Id. 
 24. See Eglit, supra note 2, at 581. 
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however, order the Secretary of Labor to conduct a study of the problem of age 
discrimination and to submit a report.25  The Secretary subsequently issued a 
report detailing the problems associated with age discrimination and 
recommending that legislation be passed to combat those problems.26  Two 
years later, after seeking more detailed recommendations, Congress enacted 
the ADEA.27 
The ADEA states that it shall be unlawful for an employer “to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s age.”28  That 
language (other than the word “age”) is identical to the language of Title VII.29  
Unlike Title VII, however, the ADEA contains an important exception, which 
states that “otherwise prohibited” actions are not prohibited in situations 
“where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.”30  
This “reasonable factors other than age” provision (RFOA provision) has been 
the basis of much of the controversy surrounding the ADEA and disparate 
impact. 
2. Disparate Impact Theory and Its Application to the ADEA 
ADEA claimants have historically utilized two distinct theories: disparate 
treatment and disparate impact.31  Disparate treatment involves cases where the 
employer intentionally discriminates against older workers.32  Conversely, 
disparate impact claims “involve employment practices that are facially neutral 
in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one 
group than another.”33  Proof of intent or motive is unnecessary.34 
The theory of disparate impact was first recognized in the 1971 Supreme 
Court case Griggs v. Duke Power Company.35  Griggs was a Title VII case that 
 
 25. Smith, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005). 
 26. Id. (citing WILLARD WIRTZ, SEC. OF LAB., THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE 
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 5 (June 1965), reprinted in U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
ACT (1981) [hereinafter WIRTZ REPORT]). 
 27. See Eglit, supra note 2, at 583. 
 28. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2000). 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2000). 
 30. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000). 
 31. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993). 
 32. Id. (stating that in such claims, “[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical” (quoting 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–36 n.15 (1977)). 
 33. Id. (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335–36 n.15). 
 34. Id. 
 35. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  For a detailed history of Griggs and disparate impact claims under 
Title VII, see Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Life, Death, and Resurrection 
of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431 (2005). 
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dealt with an employer’s policy of requiring employees to either pass a test or 
to have a high school diploma.36  Though the policy was facially neutral, it had 
an adverse and disproportionate effect on African-American employees.37  In 
its holding, the Court stated that the plaintiffs did not need to show that Duke 
Power intentionally discriminated against them through the use of the test, and 
showing that the tests had a disparate impact on the black workers was 
sufficient as long as that test could not be defended as a business necessity.38  
As the Court wrote, disparate impact analysis was a permissible construction 
of the statute because “Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the 
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.”39 
Following Griggs, courts uniformly assumed that disparate impact claims 
were cognizable not only under Title VII, but also under the ADEA.40  The 
language of the statutes was similar, and cases interpreting Title VII were often 
used in interpreting the ADEA.41  The extension seemed logical.  Several 
developments, however, cast doubt on this interpretation of the ADEA. 
The first of these developments was the Supreme Court case Wards Cove 
Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio,42 decided in 1989.  Like Griggs, Wards Cove was 
a racial discrimination suit brought under Title VII.  While the case did not 
overturn Griggs, it narrowed considerably the scope of disparate impact claims 
by raising the burden of proof for plaintiffs and lowering it for defendants.43  
First, Wards Cove required that plaintiffs specify the particular business 
decision that caused the disparate impact.44  Furthermore, Wards Cove held 
that defendants must only produce evidence to show that the “challenged 
 
 36. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428. 
 37. Id. at 429. 
 38. Id. at 432–33. 
 39. Id. at 432. 
 40. Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 236–37 (2005); see, e.g., Faulkner v. 
Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419 (10th Cir. 1993); Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 964 F.2d 106 
(2d Cir. 1992); Wooden v. Bd. of Ed. of Jefferson City, Ky., 931 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1991); 
Arnold v. United States Postal Serv., 863 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 
829 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1987); Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1986); Monroe v. 
United Airlines, 736 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Borden’s, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 
1984); Dace v. ACF Indus., 722 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1983), modified, 728 F.2d 976 (1984) (per 
curiam); Allison v. W. Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 41. See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn’t Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093, 1096–99 
(1993). 
 42. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 43. See Eglit, supra note 41, at 1129–33 (summarizing the effect Wards Cove had on 
disparate impact litigation). 
 44. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656 (“Our disparate-impact cases have always focused on the 
impact of particular hiring practices”) (emphasis in original). 
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practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the 
employer.”45 
In response to the decision in Wards Cove, which to many signaled “three 
major strides backwards in the battle against race discrimination,”46 Congress 
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991.47  That Act rejected Wards Cove (as well 
as other decisions which had narrowed the scope of disparate impact claims 
under Title VII) in large part and made various amendments to Title VII to 
ensure the continuing viability of disparate impact claims.48  Significantly, 
however, the Civil Rights Act did not make the same amendments to the 
ADEA.49  What exactly that legislative silence meant for disparate impact 
claims under the ADEA was not at all clear.50 
Furthering the growing doubt concerning disparate impact claims in age 
discrimination cases was the 1993 Supreme Court case Hazen Paper Company 
v. Biggins.51  Hazen Paper was a disparate treatment case brought under the 
ADEA.  Though the Court expressly stated that the case considered only 
disparate treatment and was not addressing whether the ADEA encompassed 
disparate impact claims,52 language in the decision cast considerable doubt on 
whether the Court believed that disparate impact claims were in fact viable 
under the ADEA.  As the Court stated, 
[d]isparate treatment, thus defined, captures the essence of what [C]ongress 
sought to prohibit in the ADEA.  It is the very essence of age discrimination 
for an older employee to be fired because the employer believes that 
productivity and competence decline with old age. . . . Congress’ promulgation 
of the ADEA was prompted by its concern that older workers were being 
deprived of employment on the basis of inaccurate and stigmatizing 
stereotypes. . . . When the employer’s decision is wholly motivated by factors 
other than age, the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes 
disappears.53 
This language seemed to imply that, at least in the context of the ADEA, 
disparate treatment was the only theory of recovery.  A business decision 
which was not made with discriminatory intent but which still had a disparate 
impact on older workers would not be based on “inaccurate and stigmatizing 
 
 45. Id. at 659.  Wards Cove aided employers not only by articulating this lowered standard, 
but also by holding that employers only had the burden of production concerning the business 
justification rather than the burden of persuasion.  Id. 
 46. Id. at 661 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 47. See generally Eglit, supra note 41. 
 48. Id. at 1102. 
 49. Id. at 1103. 
 50. Id. at 1104. 
 51. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
 52. Id. at 610. 
 53. Id. at 610–11. 
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stereotypes” about the older workers and would therefore not fall under the 
penumbra of the ADEA as described by the Hazen Paper Court. 
After Hazen Paper, the “tectonic plates” shifted54 and a circuit split 
developed concerning whether disparate impact suits were available.55  The 
Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits maintained that disparate impact was 
available as a theory of recovery under the ADEA, notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court’s language in Hazen Paper.56  Conversely, the First, Fifth, 
Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that disparate impact claims 
were not cognizable under the ADEA.57  The Supreme Court nearly resolved 
the circuit split when it granted certiorari in the case of Adams v. Florida 
Power Corp.,58 but it later dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted.59 
II.  THE RATIONALE OF THE SMITH COURT 
A. The Plurality: A Narrowed Conception of Disparate Impact 
Justice Stevens authored the primary opinion in Smith v. City of Jackson.60  
Parts I, II, and IV were joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Scalia 
and are therefore binding precedent; Part III was joined by Justices Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer.61  Part I of the opinion detailed the facts and procedural 
history of Smith,62 which are laid out in Section I.A. of this Note.  Part II 
provided a very brief legislative history of the ADEA in relation to the issue of 
disparate impact claims.63  Part III then detailed Justice Stevens’ rationale for 
holding that the ADEA, like Title VII, encompasses disparate impact claims.64  
 
 54. Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 700 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 55. See Ecker & Gagliardo, supra note 2, at 199 (providing a brief summary of the circuit 
split and the rationale underlying the Courts of Appeals’ decisions). 
 56. E.g., Arnett v. Cal. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 179 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d on 
other grounds, 528 U.S. 1111 (2000); Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358 (2d Cir. 1999); Smith 
v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 99 F.3d 1466 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Ecker & Gagliardo, supra 
note 2, at 199. 
 57. E.g., Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2001); Mullin v. Raytheon 
Co., 164 F.3d 696 (1st Cir. 1999); Maier v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 120 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 1997); 
Ellis v. United Airlines, 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Ecker, supra note 2, at 199. 
 58. 534 U.S. 1054 (2001). 
 59. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 535 U.S. 228 (2002); see Leading Cases, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 169, 343 n.48 (2005) (noting that certiorari may have been dismissed in Adams because the 
“case would have required a ‘pronouncement in the abstract’ on the availability of disparate 
impact” (quoting Adams, 255 F.3d at 1326 (Barkett, J., specially concurring)).  Adams was 
appealed purely as a question of law.  255 F.3d at 1323. 
 60. 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 231–32. 
 63. Id. at 232–33. 
 64. Id. at 233–40. 
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Finally, Part IV of the opinion applied the holding to the facts of the case and 
narrowed the scope of the holding to only those claims which dealt with 
employment decisions that could not be defended as reasonable.65 
Justice Stevens’ analysis of the issue presented in Smith began with a short 
history of the ADEA in Part II of his opinion.66  He stated that while Congress 
considered including age as one of the protected classes in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, it ultimately chose not to do so.67  Instead, Congress requested that 
Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz conduct a study concerning the issue of age 
discrimination, its sources, and how it affected the economy and individual 
workers.68  In response to this request, Wirtz submitted a report entitled “The 
Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment” (Wirtz 
Report).69  The report stated that “there was little discrimination arising from 
dislike or intolerance of older people, but that ‘arbitrary’ discrimination did 
result from certain age limits.”70  The report also noted that certain 
“[i]nstitutional arrangements” indirectly discriminated against older workers.71  
In response to the Wirtz Report and the recommendations of the Secretary of 
Labor, Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967.72  As Justice Stevens emphasized 
in his opinion, much of the language of the ADEA was identical to that of Title 
VII (except for substituting the words “race, color religion, sex, or national 
origin” with the word “age”).73  The major difference between the two statutes 
was that the ADEA, unlike Title VII, incorporated the RFOA provision.74  That 
provision provided that “otherwise prohibited” employment decisions would 
not be illegal if they were based on “reasonable factors other than age.”75 
Having laid this foundation, Justice Stevens next moved to his argument 
concerning why disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA.76  As 
previously stated, the bulk of this argument, contained in Part III of Justice 
Stevens’ opinion, was joined by only three other justices.77 
Justice Stevens began this portion of his opinion by asserting the 
importance of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the 1971 Supreme Court case which 
had recognized disparate impact claims under Title VII, as very persuasive, if 
 
 65. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240–43. 
 66. Id. at 232–33. 
 67. Id. at 232. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 26). 
 70. Smith, 544 U.S. at 232 (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 26). 
 71. Id. at 232 (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 26, at 15). 
 72. Id. at 232–33. 
 73. Id. at 233 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 229. 
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not technically binding, precedent.78  He reiterated the tenet of statutory 
construction which states that statutes with substantially similar language will 
be presumed to have the same meaning unless Congress evinces a different 
intent.79  This presumption is especially strong if the statutes were enacted 
within a short time of each other.80  For that reason, the Court has generally 
assumed that the language of Title VII and the ADEA mean the same thing and 
that the Court’s interpretations of one of the statutes may be applied to the 
other as well.81  Because Griggs interpreted the language of Title VII as not 
requiring a plaintiff to show intent, thereby allowing disparate impact claims, 
the case is a “precedent of compelling importance” in addressing the issue of 
whether the ADEA also includes disparate impact claims.82 
Justice Stevens then recounted some of the major points of the holding in 
Griggs.  He noted first that though the tests and diploma requirements at issue 
in Griggs did not facially discriminate against African Americans, such tests 
were “not to become masters of reality.”83  As was stated in Griggs, Congress 
“directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, 
not simply the motivation.”84  Therefore, employment decisions which had a 
disparate impact on protected classes, regardless of the actual intent or good 
faith of the employer, were prohibited by Title VII.85  Justice Stevens also 
emphasized the fact that the EEOC’s guidelines at the time of Griggs 
recommended that disparate impact claims be allowed under Title VII.86  
Finally, Justice Stevens mentioned, in a footnote, that both Griggs and the 
Wirtz Report specifically referred to high school diploma requirements as 
facially neutral employment qualifications which disparately impacted blacks 
and older workers, respectively.87 
Furthermore, as stated by Justice Stevens, the language of both Title VII 
and the ADEA supports the idea of disparate impact claims.88  Language in 
both statutes not only applies to actions which intentionally discriminate 
against individuals (disparate treatment), but also to any actions which have an 
adverse effect on the employee, regardless of the motivation.89  The relevant 
language, found in § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA, states that prohibited actions 
 
 78. Id. at 234. 
 79. Id. at 233. 
 80. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233. 
 81. Id. at 233–34. 
 82. Id. at 234. 
 83. Id. at 234–35 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971)). 
 84. Id. at 234 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425–26) (emphasis in original). 
 85. Smith, 544 U.S. at 235. 
 86. Id. (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433–34). 
 87. Id. at 235 n.5 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430; WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 26, at 21). 
 88. Id. at 235–36. 
 89. Id. 
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include those which, on the basis of age, “deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities,” and those which “otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee.”90  It is not so much the intent of the employer that is 
controlling, but rather the effect on the employee.91  This language, unlike the 
prohibition in § 4(a)(1) of the ADEA, which applies to actions that affect “any 
individual . . . because of such individual’s age,” has a wider scope than 
merely actions that are intentionally targeted against a single employee or 
group of employees.92 
The legislative history and statutory text of the ADEA therefore strongly 
suggest that the Act encompasses claims of disparate impact.93  For this reason, 
in the twenty years between Griggs and Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, all of the 
Courts of Appeals simply assumed that disparate impact claims were, in fact, 
available under the ADEA.94  It was not until the Supreme Court stated in 
Hazen Paper that “disparate treatment ‘captures the essence of what Congress 
sought to prohibit in the ADEA’”95 that some of the Courts of Appeals 
changed tack and held that disparate impact claims under the ADEA were 
precluded.96  In support of such holdings, the First, Seventh, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits relied on an interpretation of the legislative history of the 
ADEA contrary to that detailed by Justice Stevens, the text of the ADEA 
(specifically the RFOA provision), and the Supreme Court’s language in 
Hazen Paper.97 
Justice Stevens, however, responded to the argument based on Hazen 
Paper by emphasizing that the questionable language was merely dicta.98  As 
he observed, Hazen Paper was a disparate treatment case and therefore its 
holding was confined to such cases.99  The Court in Hazen Paper carefully 
noted that it was not determining “whether a disparate impact theory of 
liability is available under the ADEA.”100 
Justice Stevens then addressed the argument espoused by some of the 
Courts of Appeals (and by Justice O’Connor’s opinion in this case) that the 
 
 90. Smith, 544 U.S. at 235–36 (emphasis in original). 
 91. Id. at 236. 
 92. Id. at 236 n.6 (emphasis in original).  Justice Stevens made this point to rebut Justice 
O’Connor, who asserted in her opinion that the difference between the two sections of the ADEA 
was immaterial and that the thrust of the ADEA was toward a prohibition of actions directly and 
intentionally targeted at individual workers.  Id. 
 93. Id. at 236. 
 94. Id. at 236–37. 
 95. Smith, 544 U.S. at 238 (quoting Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)). 
 96. Id. at 237 (citing Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696 (1st Cir. 1999); Gantt v. Wilson 
Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042 (6th Cir. 1998)). 
 97. Id. at 238. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 237. 
 100. Smith, 544 U.S. at 238 (quoting Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 612). 
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RFOA provision of the ADEA precludes disparate impact claims.101  Justice 
Stevens argued that the RFOA provision actually supports the argument for 
allowing disparate impact claims under the ADEA.102  As he stated, the RFOA 
provision is “simply unnecessary” in most disparate treatment cases.103  If an 
employer is acting according to a factor other than age, then the action would 
not in fact be prohibited by the ADEA and the RFOA provision would not be 
needed.104  Therefore, the RFOA provision must apply primarily to disparate 
impact cases.105  In such cases, the prohibited activity is in fact not based on 
age but nevertheless adversely impacts older workers in relation to their 
younger counterparts.106  Therefore, “the RFOA provision plays its principal 
role by precluding liability if the adverse impact was attributable to a nonage 
factor that was ‘reasonable.’”107 
Finally, Justice Stevens observed that the Department of Labor and the 
EEOC both supported an interpretation of the ADEA which allowed for 
disparate impact claims.108  Therefore, he concluded that the legislative history, 
the force of precedents, the text of the ADEA, and the EEOC regulations 
supported a holding that disparate impact claims were at least theoretically 
available under the ADEA.109 
Having determined that disparate impact claims were authorized by the 
ADEA, Justice Stevens turned in Part IV of his opinion to the issues of the 
scope of disparate impact liability and to whether the plaintiffs in the present 
case had established such a claim.110  Justice Stevens wrote that the scope of 
disparate impact liability was narrower in the ADEA context than it was in 
Title VII.111  First, the RFOA provision discussed in Part III of the opinion 
suggested that an employer must only show that its policy was reasonable, 
rather than a business necessity, in order to defend against a disparate impact 
claim.112  Second, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended disparate impact 
 
 101. Id. at 238–40; see, e.g., Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1325–6 (11th Cir. 
2001) (noting that the RFOA provision’s inclusion in the ADEA shows that the ADEA, unlike 
Title VII, does not warrant disparate impact liability); Mullin, 164 F.3d at 702 (stating that if the 
RFOA provision “is not understood to preclude disparate impact liability, it becomes nothing 
more than a bromide to the effect that ‘only age discrimination is age discrimination’”). 
 102. Smith, 544 U.S. at 239. 
 103. Id. at 238. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 239. 
 106. Id. (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–36 n.15 (1997)). 
 107. Smith, 544 U.S. at 239. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 240. 
 110. Id. at 240–43.  Part IV was part of the opinion of the Court, as it was joined by Justices 
Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Scalia.  Id. at 229. 
 111. Id. at 240. 
 112. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240. 
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liability under Title VII but said nothing about such liability under the 
ADEA.113  Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio114 limited the availability of 
disparate impact claims, but the Civil Rights Act modified that holding in 
relation to Title VII cases.115  Therefore, the full thrust of Wards Cove and its 
rather strict limitations on disparate impact liability were still binding in 
ADEA cases.116 
As Justice Stevens wrote, various policy considerations supported this 
narrowed conception of disparate impact liability.117  First, unlike race or 
gender, age is often related to an individual’s ability to adequately perform at 
work.118  While this fact may be exaggerated by stereotypes about the capacity 
of older workers, it is undoubtedly true that age, unlike race, may affect work 
performance.119  Therefore, some legitimate qualifications or criteria used for 
employment decisions may necessarily and permissibly affect older workers in 
disproportionate numbers.120  Second, age discrimination has generally been 
milder and less rooted in a history of hate, bigotry, and stereotypes than has the 
discrimination prohibited by Title VII.121  While age discrimination is certainly 
a problem, the history and roots of age discrimination in comparison to racial 
or ethnic discrimination warrant that the ADEA provide less protection against 
unintentional forms of employment discrimination.122 
Finally, then, Justice Stevens applied this narrowed conception of disparate 
impact to the Smith plaintiffs, concluding that while disparate impact claims 
were available, the plaintiffs failed to establish their particular claim.123  He 
first noted that the plaintiffs merely pointed to the pay plan that, in general, 
treated older workers somewhat less generously than younger workers.124  
Whereas Wards Cove required plaintiffs to identify the “specific employment 
practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 115. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  Justice Stevens also noted that the Wirtz Report supported this claim.  Id.  It stated 
that “certain circumstances . . . unquestionably affect older workers more strongly, as a group, 
than they do younger workers.”  Id. at 240–41 (quoting WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 26, at 11). 
 120. Smith, 544 U.S. at 241. 
 121. Id.  Title VII protects against discrimination based on the basis of, “individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 20002-2(a)(1)–(2) (2000).  One of the 
primary purposes of Title VII was to eliminate negative stereotypes.  See Davis, supra note 2, at 
375. 
 122. Smith, 544 U.S. at 243. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 241. 
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disparities,”125 the plaintiffs in Smith alleged no such specific practice that was 
disproportionately affecting older workers.126  Moreover, even if the plaintiffs 
had identified a more specific practice, the pay plan in question was based on 
reasonable factors other than age and was therefore permissible.127  The pay 
plan was designed to increase the salaries of junior officers in order to make 
them competitive with surrounding cities; therefore salary increases were 
determined by seniority and rank.128  As Justice Stevens wrote, “Reliance on 
seniority and rank is unquestionably reasonable.”129  There may have been 
other ways to reach the same goal while avoiding the disparate impact on the 
older officers, but that fact does not matter in the ADEA context.130  Unlike the 
business necessity defense seen in Title VII impact cases, the employer need 
not show that its policy was the best and essentially only way of achieving the 
goal; the employer must only show that it acted reasonably.131 
B. Deference to the EEOC Guidelines: Justice Scalia’s Concurring Opinion 
Justice Scalia concurred in Parts I, II, and IV of the Court’s opinion and 
concurred in the judgment of the Court.132  The thrust of his argument was that 
the Court should defer to the views of the EEOC in interpreting the ADEA, 
which supported the availability of disparate impact claims, under the holding 
of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.133  The 
Chevron Court held that when reviewing an ambiguously worded statute which 
has been interpreted by the agency that administers it, the Court should defer to 
the agency’s interpretation if “the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”134  According to Justice Scalia, Congress gave the 
EEOC authority to issue guidelines, and the regulations espoused by the EEOC 
were reasonable.135 
Justice Scalia first noted that the ADEA granted the EEOC the authority to 
issue rules and regulations in relation to its enforcement power under the 
 
 125. Id. at 241 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989)). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Smith, 544 U.S. at 241. 
 128. Id. at 242. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. at 243. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Smith, 544 U.S. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 133. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
 134. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.  It should be noted that United States v. Mead Corp. 
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agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law.”  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 226–27 (2002).  Justice Scalia, however, rejected this approach, but stated that EEOC 
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J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 135. Smith, 544 U.S. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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statute.136  Pursuant to this power, the EEOC issued regulations which stated 
that 
[w]hen an employment practice, including a test, is claimed as a basis for 
different treatment of employees or applicants for employment on the grounds 
that it is a “factor other than” age, and such a practice has an adverse impact on 
individuals within the protected age group, it can only be justified as business 
necessity.137 
This regulation affirmed the position of the Department of Labor, which was 
the agency originally in charge of enforcing the ADEA, and it was a position 
that had been consistently supported by the EEOC since it was originally 
promulgated.138  Because the EEOC had the authority to issue guidelines and 
because the guidelines it issued were reasonable (as shown in Part III of Justice 
Stevens’s opinion), “[t]his [was] an absolutely classic case for deference to 
agency interpretation.”139 
Having established his argument concerning deference to EEOC 
interpretation, Justice Scalia then spent the remainder of his concurrence 
addressing the various arguments posed by Justice O’Connor’s opinion.140  He 
first responded to Justice O’Connor’s argument that the EEOC has not 
addressed the issue at all by referencing the language of the EEOC regulation 
quoted above.141  He then stated that this regulation applies not merely to the 
reasonable factors other than age provision, as Justice O’Connor argued, but to 
any action which adversely impacts older workers.142  The regulation therefore 
applies not only to the RFOA provision, but also to the prohibitions in § 
4(a)(2) of the ADEA.143  Finally, Justice Scalia addressed the fact that the 
EEOC regulations refer to business necessity rather than reasonable factors 
other than age as the proper defense to a disparate impact claim.144  He stated 
that merely because the Court does not defer to the EEOC’s interpretation of 
the RFOA does not mean that it may not defer to the EEOC’s views 
 
 136. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 628(2000)). 
 137. Id. at 244 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (2004)). 
 138. Id.  Justice Scalia emphasized the many disparate impact cases in which the EEOC has 
either been a party or has filed a brief as amicus curiae.  Id. (citing Brief for EEOC as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees at 12, Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d 
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pending)). 
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 144. Id. at 247. 
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concerning the availability of disparate impact.145  The two distinct ideas need 
not “stand or fall together.”146 
C. Categorical Prohibition of Disparate Impact under the ADEA: Justice 
O’Connor’s Concurring Opinion 
Justice O’Connor authored a strongly worded opinion that concurred in the 
judgment but sharply disagreed on the reasoning.147  Justice O’Connor, joined 
by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, stated that she would have held that the 
ADEA categorically denies disparate impact claims.148  Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence reasoned that the legislative history, text, and purpose of the 
ADEA demonstrate that Congress did not intend to authorize disparate impact 
claims.149  She then addressed the primary arguments of the plurality and 
Justice Scalia, arguing that Griggs v. Duke Power Co. should not be applied to 
the ADEA and that the EEOC guidelines should not be given deference.150 
Justice O’Connor began her concurring opinion by addressing the text of 
the ADEA.  She quoted § 4(a) of the statute and reaffirmed the plurality’s 
holding that § 4(a)(1) does not deal with disparate impact claims.151  She then 
addressed the issue of whether § 4(a)(2) authorizes disparate impact claims, as 
the plurality and the plaintiffs argued.152  In making her argument that § 4(a)(2) 
does not in fact authorize such claims, Justice O’Connor emphasized the 
similarities between § 4(a)(1) and § 4(a)(2).153  Section 4(a)(2) uses the “phrase 
‘because of . . . age’ in precisely the same manner as does the preceding 
paragraph—to make plain that an employer is liable only if its adverse action 
against an individual is motivated by the individual’s age.”154  The only 
difference is that § 4(a)(1) refers to actions that are “inherently harmful,” such 
as refusing to hire or discharging, while § 4(a)(2) refers to “facially neutral” 
actions, such as “limiting, segregating, or classifying” employees.155  
Therefore, § 4(a)(2)’s language concerning whether the action “deprive[s] or 
tend[s] to deprive [an] individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee” simply means that the employer’s 
action must in fact harm the plaintiff.156 
 
 145. Smith, 544 U.S. at 247. 
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Whereas the plurality read § 4(a)(2) to state that any action which 
adversely affects the individual because of the individual’s age was prohibited, 
regardless of intent, Justice O’Connor reasoned that the phrase “because of 
such individual’s age” modifies the entire paragraph.157  The phrase should not 
be given different meanings in § 4(a)(1) and § 4(a)(2).158  Therefore, the intent 
of the employer is a necessary part of any discrimination claim.  Finally, the 
incongruity between the plural at the beginning of the § 4(a)(2) and the 
singular at the end does not support the plurality’s holding because the singular 
phrase “because of such individual’s age” prohibits employment decisions if 
they are made “because of even one employee’s age and that individual (alone 
or together with others) is harmed.”159 
Justice O’Connor next addressed the RFOA provision and the plurality’s 
argument that the provision supports the authorization of disparate impact 
claims.160  Justice O’Connor stated that the RFOA provision is designed not to 
address situations in which the employer acts according to reasonable, non-age 
related factors that nonetheless adversely impact older employees; rather, she 
stated that the RFOA provision provides an “independent safe harbor from 
liability.”161  The RFOA provision was included so that an employer could 
rebut an employee’s prima facie case of discrimination by showing that it was 
acting according to “a reasonable nonage factor.”162  The provision may be 
somewhat redundant, but it was inserted in an act of cautionary drafting.163  
Moreover, the RFOA provision emphasizes that an employer in a mixed-
motive case may take the adverse action as long as it is substantially based on a 
reasonable factor other than age.164  As long as the employer does not rely on 
an irrational nonage factor, it is safe from liability.165 
Part II of Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion addressed the legislative 
history and purposes of the ADEA.  Like the plurality, Justice O’Connor began 
by citing the Wirtz Report.166  She emphasized two major points of the 
report.167  First, the report detailed that age discrimination was of a different 
nature than the types of discrimination covered under Title VII because there 
was no history of “intolerance or animus” toward older workers and because 
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age was often in fact related to an employee’s ability to perform effectively.168  
“Second, the Wirtz Report drew a sharp distinction between ‘arbitrary 
discrimination’ (which the Report clearly equates with disparate treatment) and 
circumstances or practices having a disparate impact on older workers.”169  
While the report recommended legislation to deal with the problem of arbitrary 
discrimination, it recommended various non-coercive measures to address the 
problems normally associated with disparate impact claims.170  Because the 
ADEA was drafted in response to the report, the statute should be read to only 
address disparate treatment claims.171 
As Justice O’Connor wrote, the espoused purposes of the ADEA also 
demonstrate that the statute was intended only to curb disparate treatment.172  
These purposes included: “[1] to promote employment of older persons based 
on their ability rather than age; [2] to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in 
employment; [and 3] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting 
problems arising from the impact of age on employment.”173  The substantive 
provisions that followed dealt with these purposes in turn.174  Relevant to the 
case at hand, § 4 addressed the issue of ending arbitrary discrimination.175  
Conversely, the other two purposes were addressed in sections that required 
studies, research, and other non-coercive methods of educating employers and 
the public about the problems associated with age and employment.176 
Justice O’Connor asserted two more reasons why the ADEA does not 
authorize disparate impact claims.  First, Congress did not discuss disparate 
impact claims in any way before passing the ADEA.177  Such legislative 
silence, according to Justice O’Connor, is “telling.”178  Second, policy 
considerations underlying the ADEA warrant the same result.179  Older 
workers have not suffered from the “entrenched historical patterns of 
discrimination, like racial minorities have.”180  Moreover, older workers may 
in fact be less employable than their younger counterparts.181  Their abilities 
may decline, they may be less knowledgeable about technological advances, 
 
 168. Id. at 254–55 (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 26, at 2). 
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and their benefits and high salaries make employing them more expensive.182  
For these reasons, employers should be allowed to make business decisions 
that adversely affect older workers.183 
Justice O’Connor devoted Part III of her concurrence to counter the main 
points of the plurality.  She addressed Justice Stevens’s argument that Griggs 
should be extended to the ADEA context and Justice Scalia’s argument that the 
Court should defer to the EEOC. 
Justice O’Connor began by noting the obvious textual similarities between 
Title VII and the ADEA and by referencing the rule that similar statutory 
language is normally interpreted similarly.184  As she also observed, however, 
“this is not a rigid or absolute rule,” and the Court should be cognizant of 
contrary indications of congressional intent.185  According to Justice 
O’Connor, the ADEA and Title VII should be interpreted differently.186  The 
two statutes have different textual provisions, as detailed earlier in the 
opinion.187  Also, the ADEA was intended to address a form of discrimination 
different from that at which Title VII was aimed.188  Finally, Griggs should not 
be a binding interpretation of the text of the ADEA.189  Not only was the 
decision in Griggs not actually based on the text of Title VII,190 “[b]ut Griggs 
was decided four years after the ADEA’s enactment.”191  Congress could not 
have known that the language of Title VII (and by extension, the ADEA) 
would be interpreted as it was.192 
Finally, Justice O’Connor addressed the Department of Labor and EEOC 
regulations cited by the plurality, and especially Justice Scalia, stating that she 
did not believe the guidelines were deserving of deference and that she would 
“give no weight to the statements in question.”193  First, she argued that the 
Department of Labor guidelines were practical guidelines designed to aid 
employers in attempting to comply with the RFOA provision.194  They were 
meant to explain the RFOA provision and how employers could ensure that 
their policies would fall under it; the statement did not even address the 
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“ADEA’s prohibitory provisions.”195  The EEOC guideline is subject to the 
same criticism.196  “Quite simply, the agency has not actually exercised its 
delegated authority to resolve any ambiguity in the relevant provision’s text, 
much less done so in a reasonable or persuasive manner.”197  Finally, this 
EEOC statement is contrary to the actual holding of the Court.198  While the 
statement interprets the RFOA provision to require that an employer defend a 
policy as a business necessity, the Court held that companies may defend 
themselves by merely showing that their actions are reasonable rather than 
necessary.199 
In closing, Part IV of Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion argued that if 
disparate impact claims must be allowed under the ADEA, they should be 
strictly limited.200  Employers must be able to defend against such claims by 
citing reasonable factors, which Justice O’Connor defines as factors that are 
“rationally related to some legitimate business objective.”201  Moreover, claims 
should be subject to the strict pleading requirements of Wards Cove.202 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The Smith v. City of Jackson decision undoubtedly resolved the circuit split 
regarding the issue of disparate impact liability under the ADEA, bringing at 
least some closure to the matter.  The answer provided by the Supreme Court, 
however, was unsatisfactory.  On a theoretical level, the rationale of both the 
plurality’s and Justice O’Connor’s opinions was rather unpersuasive.  On a 
more practical level, while the plurality’s holding theoretically authorized 
impact suits, it narrowed such claims to the point that very few claimants will 
actually be successful in their disparate impact cases.  For those reasons, the 
Court should have taken an approach similar (although not identical) to Justice 
Scalia’s and deferred to the EEOC’s interpretation of the ADEA, which would 
allow for disparate impact suits and require businesses to defend them on the 
grounds of business necessity.203  Such deference is appropriate because the 
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debate regarding disparate impact suits is so inconclusive.  Moreover, 
upholding the business necessity defense in accordance with the EEOC’s 
interpretation would have provided a better practical result than the 
compromised position taken by the Smith plurality. 
A. Rehashing Old Arguments: The Unpersuasive Rationale of the Court 
Aside from any practical problems spawned by Smith’s holding, the 
rationale of both the plurality’s and Justice O’Connor’s opinions are less than 
persuasive.204  Part of the problem with the plurality’s reasoning is that the 
facts of the case did not support the holding.  Had the Jackson police officers 
stated a claim which somehow met the stringent standards set by the Court, the 
plurality could have rested its reasoning on a concrete example of what it 
considered a proper ADEA disparate impact claim.  More importantly, though, 
the reasoning of both the plurality and Justice O’Connor is unpersuasive 
because the entire disparate impact debate has proven to be particularly 
inconclusive. 
As mentioned previously in this Note, the issue of allowing disparate 
impact claims under the ADEA has been the source of a great deal of judicial 
and academic discussion.205  Just as a circuit split developed among the various 
Courts of Appeals, a split also developed among academics.206  Neither side 
has gained a clear advantage.  The problem is that although there are legitimate 
arguments on both sides of the debate, none of the arguments are particularly 
conclusive or persuasive.207  Judicial opinions and academic articles 
advocating one side or the other seem to simply pick a conclusion and then 
support it by choosing from a “grab bag of arguments.”208 
 
 204. See Sarah Benjes, Comment, Smith v. City of Jackson: A Pretext of Victory for 
Employees, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 231, 246 (2005) (referring to both opinions as containing 
“lengthy rhetoric”). 
 205. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 206. Compare Johnson, supra note 6, at 1402 (arguing in favor of disparate impact), and 
Kaminshine, supra note 6, at 234 (same), and Mack A. Player, Wards Cove Packing or Not 
Wards Cove Packing? That is Not the Question: Some Thoughts on Disparate Impact Analysis 
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 819 (1997) (same), and 
Saunders, supra note 6, at 593 (same), with Davis, supra note 2 (arguing against disparate 
impact), and Herbert & Shelton, supra note 6, at 626–27 (same), and Cozza, supra note 6, at 793 
(same), and Pontz, supra note 6, at 270–71 (same). 
 207. See Davis, supra note 2, at 379 (“The analysis then turns to a series of counterarguments, 
none of which is convincing.”); Player, supra note 206, at 826 (stating that “[s]ound arguments 
are made on both sides, but appear, in the abstract, to be inconclusive”).  See generally Stuart L. 
Bass & George S. Roukis, Age Discrimination in Employment: Will Employers Focus on 
Business Necessities and the ‘ROFTA’ Defense?, 104 COM. L.J. 229, 239 (1999) (lamenting the 
“confused body of law” surrounding disparate impact liability under the ADEA). 
 208. Davis, supra note 2, at 421. 
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The members of the Smith Court seemed to do exactly that.  While Justice 
Stevens sampled from the usual arguments made by pro-impact advocates, 
Justice O’Connor summarized the arguments of those opposed to disparate 
impact.  Contrary conclusions were reached on rather tenuous inferences from 
the same general pool of arguments and evidence. 
1. Summarizing the Debate 
a. Textual Arguments 
As Justice Stevens’s and Justice O’Connor’s differing interpretations of the 
textual provisions of the ADEA exemplify, the meaning of the words of the 
statute is ambiguous.  Because much of the ADEA’s language parallels that of 
Title VII and both the Supreme Court and Congress have explicitly stated that 
Title VII encompasses disparate impact claims, proponents of impact suits 
argue that the ADEA must also include such suits.209  Opponents argue, 
however, that the words of the ADEA, especially the phrase “‘because of such 
individual’s age’ scream intent.”210  The RFOA provision is also cited by both 
sides in support of their respective arguments.  Some claim that if the RFOA 
provision does not preclude disparate impact claims, “it becomes nothing more 
than a bromide to the effect that ‘only age discrimination is age 
discrimination.’”211  Others argue, however, that the RFOA provision would in 
fact have “no meaning at all” if the ADEA did not authorize disparate impact 
cases.212  Ultimately, scholars on both sides make valid arguments (as do 
Justices Stevens and O’Connor), but the only sure conclusion appears to be 
that statutory interpretation of the ADEA concerning disparate impact claims is 
ambiguous and inconclusive. 
b. Legislative Intent Arguments 
Similarly, the legislative intent for the ADEA also appears to be 
inconclusive.  Similarities and differences from Title VII, while perhaps 
somewhat helpful in determining Congress’s intent, do not solve the problem, 
because disparate impact was not authorized until Griggs, a case decided 
several years after both statutes were written.213  Congress could not have 
foreseen how Griggs would interpret Title VII.214  Moreover, the Wirtz Report 
ultimately proves to be rather unhelpful because both sides cite different (or 
 
 209. See Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 234 (2005) (“Griggs is . . . a 
precedent of compelling importance.”). 
 210. Cozza, supra note 6, at 792; see also Saunders, supra note 6, at 592 (arguing that “the 
[ADEA’s] express language only provides for the disparate treatment theory of liability”). 
 211. Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 702 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 212. Johnson, supra note 6, at 1416. 
 213. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 260 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 214. Id. 
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even the same) parts of the Secretary’s report in support of their respective 
positions.215  For example, Justice O’Connor cited the fact that the Wirtz 
Report found no evidence of age discrimination based on animus toward older 
workers to show that only intentional age discrimination is a problem.216  
Conversely, Justice Stevens pointed toward the same finding and compared it 
favorably to Griggs, where the Court found no evidence of racial animus yet 
still upheld the validity of the disparate impact claim.217 
c. Arguments Based on Precedent 
Until the Smith decision, Supreme Court precedents also did not provide 
definitive guidance to the disparate impact question.  Griggs provided evidence 
that impact suits were cognizable under Title VII, but the differences between 
Title VII and the ADEA prevented this case from being binding in the ADEA 
context.218  Hazen Paper v. Biggins was certainly an important case, but again 
the impact was ambiguous.  Disparate impact opponents pointed to the Court’s 
language in the case stating that “[d]isparate treatment, thus defined, captures 
the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA.”219  Proponents 
reminded them, however, that the Court had also stated that the plaintiff in the 
case had stated only a disparate treatment claim and that the Court was 
therefore not deciding whether disparate impact claims are available under the 
ADEA.220 
 
 215. Compare id. at 235 n.5 (plurality opinion), with id. at 254–56 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); see also Kaminshine, supra note 6, at 290–92 (providing an “alternative 
construction” of the report which favors disparate impact); Player, supra note 206, at 828 (stating 
that “opponents of impact analysis rely quite heavily on the [Wirtz Report]”). 
 216. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 255 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 
26, at 2). 
 217. Id. at 235 n.5 (plurality opinion) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 
(1971); WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 26, at 6). 
 218. See id. at 234 (“Griggs is therefore a precedent of compelling importance.”); id. at 262 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting the textual differences between the ADEA and Title VII, and 
arguing that the Griggs “rationale finds no parallel in the ADEA context”). 
 219. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993); see Smith, 544 U.S. at 247–48 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 220. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610; see Smith, 544 U.S. at 238 (plurality opinion). 
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d. Policy Arguments221 
Because the text, legislative history, and case law seem inconclusive, the 
issue must turn on policy.  Again, however, the ideas summarized by the Smith 
Court are rather inconclusive, primarily because they often draw from the same 
background facts to make contrary conclusions. 
First, the problem of age discrimination is certainly different from the 
problem of gender, religious, and especially racial discrimination.  Opponents 
of disparate impact use these differences to argue that because ageism does not 
have the same malevolent history as the problems accompanying racism, 
disparate impact should be precluded in age discrimination cases.222  Everyone 
at some point ages and their jobs are often filled by younger workers; such is 
the progression of life.223  In response to this claim, however, proponents of 
disparate impact argue that such claims are necessary because the inaccurate 
stereotypes about older people that cause employment discrimination are 
unlikely to simply disappear.224  Though ageism is not usually the source of 
any particular malice, the unconscious use of stereotypes necessitates the 
availability of disparate impact claims.225  While everyone ages, old age “is 
surely as immutable as one’s race or gender.”226 
Another point of contention is the fact that, unlike race, age directly 
correlates with both the ability of the worker and a company’s expenses in 
 
 221. See Gold, supra note 6, at 73–85 (providing an excellent survey of the various policies 
and purposes behind the ADEA).  This treatment of the policy debate is by no means exhaustive, 
and the Court itself did not address many of the policies put forward by commentators.  One such 
interesting policy is that disparate impact claims should be allowed because keeping older 
workers employed saves the government money on various social programs.  See id. at 84–85.  
Another states that disparate impact claims should not be allowed because ADEA cases, unlike 
Title VII cases, are argued before juries, and juries are simply not able to sufficiently conduct the 
complex statistical analysis required in disparate impact claims.  See Herbert & Shelton, supra 
note 6, at 650–60. 
 222. Smith, 544 U.S. at 258–59 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[D]isparate impact liability 
under the ADEA cannot be justified and is not necessary, as a means of redressing the cumulative 
effects of past discrimination.”); see Eglit, supra note 2, at 616 (“[T]he kind of ‘we-they’ thinking 
that fosters racial, ethnic, and sexual discrimination is unlikely to play a large role” in age 
discrimination “because the people who do the hiring and firing are generally as old as the people 
they hire and fire.” (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 320–21 (1995)). 
 223. Pontz, supra note 6, at 315 (observing that even absent discrimination, “older employees 
are constantly moving out of the labor market, while younger ones move in”). 
 224. Eglit, supra note 2, at 683; cf. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240–41 (positing that Congress inserted 
the RFOA provision into the ADEA as a reflection of the historical differences between the two 
kinds of discrimination). 
 225. Johnson, supra note 6, at 1435. 
 226. Kaminshine, supra note 6, at 307. 
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employing such workers.227  First, older workers are almost universally more 
expensive to employ because, for example, they have higher salaries and fringe 
benefits.228  Therefore, when companies downsize, older workers are often the 
first to go.229  The two sides of the debate perceive this reality of the modern 
economy differently, however.  Proponents argue that the “plight of older 
workers in the current economy,” where they are often the first workers laid-
off, warrants the greater protection provided by disparate impact claims.230  
Opponents of disparate impact, however, spin the same facts differently, 
claiming that allowing disparate impact claims will preclude businesses from 
making necessary, albeit painful, decisions during difficult economic times.231 
Furthermore, age (again, unlike race) may and sometimes does in fact 
correlate with a worker’s ability to perform adequately.232  While “individuals 
vary as to how they age and how they adapt to aging,”233 there is certainly a 
connection between age and ability.234  Proponents argue that disparate impact 
analysis is needed to prevent employers from making stereotypes about older 
workers and to force them to evaluate workers solely on ability.235  
Conversely, opponents argue that disparate impact claims should not be 
allowed to punish employers who are simply making decisions based on 
ability, even if those decisions have a disparate impact on older workers.236 
 
 227. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240 (noting that age often “has relevance to an individual’s capacity 
to engage in certain types of employment”); id. at 259 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (concluding 
that “there often is a correlation between an individual’s age and her ability to perform a job”). 
 228. See Eglit, supra note 2, at 688; Gold, supra note 6, at 79–80; Kaminshine, supra note 6, 
at 232.  African Americans and women, by contrast, are not inherently more expensive to employ 
than are whites or men.  Kaminshine, supra note 6, at 232.  But see Johnson, supra note 6, at 
1401 (arguing that a “realistic assessment of the relative productivity of workers” will show that 
older workers are not necessarily more expensive (quoting Gary Minda, Opportunistic 
Downsizing of Aging Workers: The 1990s Version of Age and Pension Discrimination in 
Employment, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 511, 539–50 (1997))). 
 229. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 1406.  But see Barbara Rose, Age-Bias Landscape Shifts, 
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31, 2005, at A1 (reporting that age discrimination claims have been steady for 
the last decade). 
 230. Sweeney, supra note 6, at 1576; see Johnson, supra note 6, at 1406 (arguing that “[t]he 
now too-common corporate practice of downsizing” shows the need for heightened protection of 
older workers). 
 231. Cozza, supra note 6, at 793; see Ecker & Gagliardo, supra note 2, at 198 (expressing 
employers’ concern “that applying disparate impact analysis under the ADEA would create undue 
court scrutiny of every cost-based employment decision”). 
 232. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 240, 259 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 233. Eglit, supra note 2, at 678. 
 234. Pontz, supra note 6, at 302. 
 235. Gold, supra note 6, at 78. 
 236. See Cozza, supra note 6, at 793. 
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2. The Tiebreaker 
As this survey of the debate has shown, there is simply no definitive 
solution to the disparate impact problem in the ADEA context.  Such a 
dilemma is of course not particularly foreign to Supreme Court jurisprudence.  
Many cases that reach the Supreme Court include two competing arguments 
that are both reasonable and widely supported.237  These cases have almost 
always been argued fully and completely at the appellate level and in 
academia.  Otherwise, the issue would not be fully ripe for Supreme Court 
review.238  This case, however, and the debate surrounding it, seems 
particularly troublesome.239  For that reason, judicial deference to an 
administrative agency is especially appropriate. 
First, it must be noted that Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in which he 
advocates deference to the EEOC’s interpretation of the ADEA is not without 
its problems, as Justice O’Connor makes abundantly clear.240  Whether EEOC 
regulations or interpretations of the ADEA (or other statutes) are deserving of 
judicial deference under Chevron is certainly a debatable issue.241  What this 
Note advocates, however, is not so much strict adherence to the Chevron 
doctrine, but simple deference to appropriate agencies in cases such as Smith 
where there is no satisfactory answer to a debate, and where a particular 
agency has more expertise than does the Court.  As the Chevron Court stated, 
the principle of deference to administrative interpretations “has been 
consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or 
reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full 
understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has 
depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected 
to agency regulations.”242 
 
 237. Pontz, supra note 6, at 302. 
 238. See Michael C. Dorf, The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 66 
(1998). 
The Court sometimes defers decision on a relatively novel question of federal law so that 
the issue can ‘percolate’ in the state and lower federal courts.  Rather than decide such 
issues immediately, the Court hopes to address them with the benefit of well-reasoned 
opinions by the federal courts of appeals and perhaps the state courts of last resort. 
Id. at 65. 
 239. See Player, supra note 206, at 826 (“Sound arguments are made on both sides, but 
appear, in the abstract, to be inconclusive.”). 
 240. See Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 263 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 241. See id. at 265 n.2 (citing Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 
(2004), which “decline[ed] to address whether EEOC’s regulations interpreting the ADEA [were] 
entitled to Chevron deference.”).  The subtleties of the Chevron doctrine are outside the scope of 
this Note. 
 242. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (quoting 
Accord Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crise, 467 U.S. 691, 699–700 (1984)). 
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The EEOC is better equipped to handle the difficult policy questions that 
accompany the issue of disparate impact liability and to assess practical results 
and implications of changes in the law.243  The EEOC’s interpretation is also a 
reasonable interpretation of the ADEA.244  In cases such as Smith, where the 
debate is inconclusive and an administrative agency has taken a reasonable 
position, the Court should look to that agency’s interpretation as the proverbial 
tiebreaker.  In this case, then, the Court should have deferred to the EEOC’s 
interpretation of the ADEA that allows for disparate impact suits and requires 
businesses to assert a business necessity defense, rather than a reasonableness 
defense, in response to such suits. 
B. The Limited Practical Implications of Smith 
In addition to the problems with its reasoning, the Smith holding poses 
practical problems as well.  At first glance, the decision seems to be a major 
victory for older workers in America.  It authorizes disparate impact claims 
under the ADEA where some courts and commentators had seriously 
questioned the continuing viability of such claims.245  In fact, shortly after 
Smith was decided, many commentators hailed the case as an important 
triumph for plaintiffs and employees.  Gerald D. Skoning, a Chicago attorney, 
called the decision “the most significant employment discrimination decision 
by the Supreme Court in this decade, probably in a couple of decades.”246  
Similarly, AARP attorney Daniel Kohrman hailed the decision as “a huge 
victory that will make it possible to bring important cases with broad 
impact.”247  The praise, however, has been tempered by an examination of the 
practical reality of the decision. 
First, the foundation underlying Smith’s precedential value is rather shaky.  
The Smith decision garnered only a plurality.  While five Justices (Justices 
 
 243. See id. at 864 (stating that “policy arguments are more properly addressed to legislators 
or administrators, not to judges.”). 
 244. See, e.g., Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1999) (assuming that the 
business necessity defense applies to ADEA disparate impact cases); see also Smith, 544 U.S. at 
239 (citing the Department of Labor and EEOC interpretations).  But see id. at 266 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (pointing out the difference between reasonable factors other than age (the statute 
language) and business necessity (the EEOC’s interpretation)). 
 245. See, e.g., Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 702 (1999) (explaining that after Hazen 
Paper, many courts questioned the availability of disparate impact claims under the ADEA). 
 246. Francine Knowles, What Ruling Means to Workers Employers, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 
31, 2005, at 55–56. 
 247. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Age-Bias Law Extended, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31, 2005, at 1.  
Kohrman went on to state that the decision would help older employees protect themselves 
against employer policies based on “unfounded stereotypes.”  Id.; see also Joan Biskupic, Justices 
Rule for Over-40 Workers; Deliberate Bias not a Condition, USA TODAY, Mar. 31, 2005 
(quoting AARP lawyer Laurie McCann’s statement that because employees rarely have a 
“smoking gun,” the decision was “a huge shot in the arm for age-discrimination plaintiffs”). 
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Stevens, Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, Scalia) agreed on three parts of the opinion, 
only four (excluding Justice Scalia) agreed on Part III of the opinion.  It was 
that section that provided the crucial parts of the rationale for the holding.  
Furthermore, former Chief Justice Rehnquist took no part in the holding.248  
Had the Chief Justice taken part in the disposition of the case, he likely would 
have joined Justice O’Connor’s opinion rather than that of Justice Stevens.  
The former Chief Justice made it clear on several occasions that he did not 
support disparate impact claims in the context of the ADEA.249  Ultimately, 
however, the former Chief Justice’s vote would not have changed the outcome 
of Smith; the vote would have remained 5-4 on the section providing the 
holding.250 
The recent changes to the makeup of the Supreme Court could affect the 
foundation of the Smith decision.  Newly appointed Chief Justice Roberts 
appears to be relatively conservative and would likely vote the same way as the 
former Chief Justice.251  Also, newly appointed Justice Alito has shown some 
signs that he is willing to limit employment discrimination claims.252  While 
the new votes would not have been sufficient by themselves to change the 
outcome of Smith, the rightward movement of the Court could pose future 
problems for a holding like Smith.253 
Regardless of whether Smith could withstand a challenge in a more 
conservative Court, the praise of its holding has also been tempered by the 
likelihood that few age discrimination claimants will be successful under 
 
 248. Smith, 544 U.S. at 243. 
 249. See Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 948 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court had never authorized disparate impact claims 
under the ADEA).  The former Chief Justice also joined Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Hazen 
Paper Co. v. Biggins, an opinion that implied that disparate impact claims were disfavored.  507 
U.S. 604, 617–18 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  See generally Eglit, supra note 2, at 696–97 
(summarizing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s views concerning disparate impact claims). 
 250. Whether the former Chief Justice’s presence would have had some other effect, such as 
influencing fellow conservative Justice Scalia’s vote is a separate and unanswerable question. 
 251. No cases from Chief Justice Roberts’ short time serving on the D.C. Circuit shed light on 
his views concerning this issue, however. 
 252. See Sheridan v. DuPont Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1078 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting inpart).  In Sheridan, a case dealing with sexual discrimination, then-Judge 
Alito dissented in part from a Third Circuit decision that altered the summary judgment standard 
in the employee’s favor.  Id.  While Sheridan did not deal with age discrimination, the case could 
show a tendency on the part of Justice Alito to favor employers in employment discrimination 
cases, thereby demonstrating that he could be opposed to disparate impact liability. 
 253. See generally Charles Babington, Alito is Sworn in on High Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 
2006, at A11 (concerning the issue of whether “[c]onservatives hope the cerebral and relatively 
young Roberts and Alito will join Thomas and Antonin Scalia to form a long-lasting right-center-
bloc that will frequently attract at least one other justice . . . to overturn liberal rulings”). 
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Smith’s narrowed conception of disparate impact suits.254  Stephen Bokat, 
executive vice president of the National Chamber Litigation Center, described 
the decision as “the [C]ourt opening the door to disparate impact age claims, 
but opening it only a narrow crack.”255  Likewise, Pittsburgh attorney Carole 
Katz said that “[i]n some ways, [the Court has] given with one hand and taken 
away with the other.”256  The situations in which Smith will actually apply 
appear to be few and far between.  While the decision appears to be a victory 
for plaintiffs, “there may, in fact, be less to the decision than it initially 
appears.”257  As an initial example, while the Court opened the door to 
disparate impact claims in theory, it held that the plaintiffs in the case had not 
established a valid claim.258 
Because the Court determined that businesses could defend disparate 
impact claims by demonstrating that the employment decision was based on a 
reasonable factor other than age, the scope of available claims is considerably 
narrower than in Title VII cases where the employer must show that the policy 
was a business necessity.  The Court did not precisely define what exactly 
constitutes a reasonable factor,259 but it is clear that reasonableness is not the 
same as a business necessity.260  Professor Michael Gold stated that a 
reasonable factor is one that is not irrational and that serves a “legitimate 
business goal.”261  Professor Mack Player stated that reasonableness falls 
somewhere along a spectrum between illegality and necessity.262  He 
 
 254. See Benjes, supra note 204, at 246 (“The lengthy rhetoric of the plurality and Justice 
O’Connor in Smith seeking to rationalize their opposing arguments about disparate impact claims 
was a moot exercise because the end result of this case, and virtually all future cases of disparate 
impact claims under ADEA will be the same: the employee will be unable to establish a prima 
facie case of disparate impact.”). 
 255. Greenburg, supra note 247. 
 256. Jim McKay, Ruling Unlikely to Lead to Slew of New Lawsuits, PITT. POST GAZETTE, 
Mar. 31, 2005, at D10.  Katz went on to say that she did not believe that the decision would result 
in an “onslaught of litigation,” even in regions with older populations.  Id. 
 257. Sid Steinberg, ‘Disparate Impact’ May Result in Less Than It Appears, LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 13, 2005, at 5. 
 258. Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005).  It must be noted that a 
possible grounds for the dismissal of certiorari in Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 535 U.S. 228 
(2002), was the fact that the Court did not want to make a “pronouncement in the abstract,” 
because the trial court had made no findings of fact.  See Leading Cases, supra note 59, at 343 
n.48.  While the trial court did make findings in the present case, the Smith plurality’s holding 
still has some semblance to a “pronouncement in the abstract” because the Court was presented 
with a “woefully underdeveloped record.”  Id. at 343.  Moreover, the particular facts of the case 
did not demonstrate a concrete example of a successful disparate impact case.  See id. 
 259. The Court did note, however, that “[r]eliance on seniority and rank is unquestionably 
reasonable.”  Smith, 544 U.S. at 242. 
 260. Davis, supra note 2, at 384. 
 261. Gold, supra note 6, at 56. 
 262. Player, supra note 206, at 839. 
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ultimately determined that reasonableness should be defined as “business 
rationality.”263 
With these definitions in mind, Smith’s lack of practical implications 
becomes apparent.  It is very difficult to think of a situation in which a 
business would act in a way to fall under the definition of disparate impact 
provided in Smith.  The business would have to take an action that was not 
supported by any kind of business rationality, the action could not be intended 
to harm older workers, yet the action would nevertheless have to harm older 
workers disproportionately.  One possible scenario could involve an employer 
requiring its employees to take some sort of computer literacy test even though 
the employees did not use computers for their work.  Such a test would almost 
surely have a disparate impact on older workers, and it would also be 
unreasonable.  However, examples of such situations would probably be quite 
isolated because businesses normally do not act in such an irrational fashion.  
Moreover, if a business was acting unreasonably, such unreasonableness could 
possibly serve as indirect evidence of discriminatory intent, rendering the 
impact claim superfluous. 
As Professor Kaminshine wrote, “rarely will a neutral practice prove so 
irrational as to serve no plausible business interest or convenience.”264  
Businesses simply do not act that way.  Businesses will certainly have to be 
careful about pay plans, reductions in force, and other issues, but “[m]ost 
employers already are somewhat sensitive to any plans that seem to have any 
disparate impact on any protected class.”265  Because “disparate impact 
protection under the ADEA is a fragile veneer pierced by any reasonable 
explanation,”266 the effect of allowing disparate impact claims under the 
ADEA in only these circumstances will be very slim indeed. 
The practical effect, then, of Smith is to remove essentially, if not actually, 
disparate impact liability from the ADEA.  Such a compromised result serves 
no one well.  Courts that recognized disparate impact suits had uniformly 
applied the business necessity standard rather than the reasonableness 
standard.267  Most commentators agreed with this approach as well.268  
Applying the business necessity standard would also align ADEA cases with 
 
 263. Id. at 840. 
 264. Kaminshine, supra note 6, at 313. 
 265. Rose, supra note 229 (quoting Chicago attorney Donald McNeil). 
 266. Davis, supra note 2, at 386. 
 267. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 99 F.3d 1466, 1471 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(discussing the scope of the business necessity defense); Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 964 F.2d 
106, 115 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 268. See Davis, supra note 2, at 386 (arguing that allowing businesses to defend with any 
reasonable factor, rather than with business necessity, would render the ADEA too “fragile”); 
Saunders, supra note 6, at 599 (assuming that business necessity applies).  But see Johnson, supra 
note 6, at 1402 (employer should have to justify action as a “reasonable factor other than age”). 
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Title VII cases.  Whereas the reasonableness standard is unclear,269 the 
business necessity defense is relatively well defined, partly because of 
extensive Title VII litigation.270 
Moreover, requiring a business necessity defense from employers would 
still not result in an avalanche of successful disparate impact cases that could 
potentially harm businesses.  Even before Hazen Paper, when all of the 
circuits recognized disparate impact liability under the ADEA, it was still 
rather difficult for plaintiffs to escape the summary judgment phase of 
litigation concerning their impact claims.271  There is no reason why that fact 
would change now. 
Finally, if disparate impact liability as advocated here proved too difficult 
for businesses to defend against, or if Congress determined that it did not agree 
with such an interpretation of the ADEA, Congress could always address the 
matter by amending the statute.272  As was stated in Chevron, “policy 
arguments are more properly addressed to legislators or administrators, not to 
judges.”273  The legislature is better suited to address the difficult policy issues 
that accompany the disparate impact debate, and Congress is probably the 
appropriate body to make substantive changes to the interpretation of the 
ADEA.274 
 
 269. See supra notes 259–63 and accompanying text (describing unsettled meaning of 
reasonableness); see also Player, supra note 206, at 839 (stating that the reasonable factor defense 
has been “virtually unlitigated under the ADEA”); Benjes, supra note 204, at 249 (stating that the 
Smith Court did not offer any standards by which to judge reasonableness). 
 270. Cf. Eglit, supra note 41, at 1096–100 (summarizing the “joint doctrinal development” of 
the ADEA and Title VII). 
 271. See, e.g., Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 358 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that disparate 
impact claims are available under the ADEA, but denying plaintiffs’ claim on the facts); Dist. 
Council 37 v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 113 F.3d 347, 347 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(upholding jury verdict against the employee on the facts of the case); Smith v. City of Des 
Moines, Iowa, 99 F.3d 1466, 1466 (8th Cir. 1996) (recognizing the availability of disparate 
impact claims but also that defendant’s actions were justified as a business necessity); Holt v. 
Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 36–37 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that plaintiff did not state a 
cognizable disparate impact claim).  But see Arnett v. Cal. Pub. Ret. Sys., 179 F.3d 690, 690 (9th 
Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 528 U.S. 1111 (2000) (holding that plaintiffs stated a 
cognizable disparate impact cause of action); Fisher v. Transco Servs.-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 
1239, 1239 (7th Cir. 1992) (reversing summary judgment against plaintiff alleging disparate 
impact case). 
 272. After all, Congress took a similar action when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  
See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
 273. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864 (1984). 
 274. See Sweeney, supra note 6, at 1577 (arguing that Congress should amend the ADEA to 
explicitly authorize disparate impact claims in the same manner as it amended Title VII through 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991); see also Pontz, supra note 6, at 322 n.325. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Smith v. City of Jackson decision at least partially settled a 
longstanding debate concerning disparate impact liability in age discrimination 
suits.  As a result of the Smith plurality’s holding, disparate impact claims are 
now unambiguously cognizable under the ADEA.  Under Smith, though, such 
claims are available in a narrower set of circumstances than are comparable 
suits under Title VII.  Businesses may defend against disparate impact suits not 
by showing that its actions were necessary, but simply by producing evidence 
showing that they were reasonable. 
The Smith decision is problematic for two reasons.  First, the reasonings of 
both the plurality and Justice O’Connor were unconvincing.  Second, because 
the Court significantly narrowed the scope of disparate impact claims, age 
discrimination plaintiffs will be hard-pressed to plead a successful disparate 
impact case.  Because of these two problems, the Court should have deferred to 
the views of the EEOC and held that disparate impact claims are not only 
available under the ADEA, but also that they may only be defended on the 
grounds of business necessity.  Such a holding would have been more 
persuasive than simply citing conflicting sides of an inconclusive debate.  It 
also would have made impact claims feasible to at least a few more plaintiffs 
than did the Smith decision. 
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